A US National Research Council (NRC) report released yesterday (September 9) recommends that access to genome data on microbial pathogens–even potential bioterror agents–should not be restricted, nor should there be any change to the current practices of genomic data release.

"We decided that there was much more to be gained by having the free interaction among scientists and the free interchange of information than there was by having some kind of restriction or registration," report committee chair Stanley Falkow, a professor of microbiology and immunology at Stanford University, told The Scientist. "It would be like patterning all of modern science with the expectation and worry about a small number of people."

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Institutes of Health, and the National Science Foundation commissioned the report from the NRC in an effort to seek outside expertise on how to handle the release of genomic information.

Report authors determined that restrictions on genomics data were ill advised for two major reasons, according to committee member Terrance Taylor. From a practical standpoint, it would be nearly impossible to control or restrict access to the loads of genomics data that have already been released–the genomes of over 100 microbial pathogens are freely available on the Internet. And even if such control were possible, restrictions could impede crucial international scientific and public health investigations and collaborations, such as the recent, rapid international response to SARS. "Our conclusion was that openness in this case was the best defense," said Taylor.

Falkow noted that genomic data is not easily categorized according to risk level because the danger posed has much to do with intent. For example, anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), shares many genes with close relative Bacillus cereus, yet the latter is not among the potential bioterror agents listed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "We did not see anything inherent in any kind of genomic information that made it any kind of security risk," said Falkow.

The report did call for "regular meetings of scientific and security experts" to be held in order to "discuss the implications of new developments and to develop coherent responses." The report suggested that such meetings might be governed by the recently instituted National Science Advisory Board (NSABB), which was inspired by another recent NRC report. Yet another earlier report had suggested the creation of a voluntary review system for all US science with bioterrorism potential.

However, the authors of the report released yesterday did recommend that a dedicated subcommittee of the NSABB or even a separate entity might be necessary. Falkow suggested a body, perhaps akin to the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, which would consider genomics data not only in the context of biosecurity, but in the context of broader ethical and public health issues. One very under-appreciated aspect of genomic data release that should be considered, according to the committee, is information related to the host-pathogen interaction. "When you're talking about an infectious agent, you're not just talking about an organism in a vacuum," said Falkow.

Echoing the earlier NRC report, this report also recommends convening an international forum to "discuss the potential for the misapplication of life science research" and to "serve as a first step toward achieving harmonized international oversight." Taylor, referring to his personal views rather than those of the committee, said he supports something like the Asilomar meeting in the mid-1970s that was held in response to the development of recombinant DNA–only with a more general focus on the safety, security, and ethical issues that are arising as a result of rapid advances in the life sciences. He said he also envisions an independent, globally recognized "International Center for the Life Sciences" where individuals or groups would commit to a code of conduct and study topics of international interest.