The United States has no national plan to defend against the intentional introduction of biological agents in an act of agricultural terror, according to a new report by the National Research Council of the US National Academies of Science. The 194-page report, 'Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism', was commissioned by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). It calls for the immediate compilation of a prioritized list of potential threat agents and definition of the roles of the various federal and state agencies that would respond to an intentional release of such agents. In the long term, the report urges increasing basic understanding of plant and animal pathogens so that new tools for detecting and controlling an outbreak can be developed.

According to panel member Jim Cook, a wheat researcher from Washington State University, the likelihood of agricultural bioterrorism is low but the possibility is inevitable. "We need to take a long term view," he told The Scientist, "while doing all we can on the front end that is quick and effective and not too costly, in terms of investment in basic research — that's a huge part of protecting ourselves. And it's a real deterrent when it's understood we have the tools to detect, respond to and recover from [an attack]."

The report was requested by USDA before September 11, 2001. In an unusual move, however, the National Research Council (NRC) provided the document to the USDA and the Office of Homeland Security in advance of its public release last week, which enabled the USDA to have already taken action in response to some of the report's recommendations. On August 12, USDA published an initial list of potential threat agents, which include 27 biological agents or toxins relating to plant pathogens and 23 related to animal pathogens.

Although the NRC report is not classified, National Academies of Science (NAS) officials removed material from the public version. USDA originally asked that the entire report be withheld. Instead, according to the report's forward, the chapter on case studies and other portions containing "detailed and specific discussions of certain matters" were removed to an appendix, which will not be distributed to the public.

Panel chair Harley Moon, from the Department of Veterinary Pathology at Iowa State University, was not surprised by the redaction, though he said the panel was very careful in how they worded things and made a number of revisions. "But," he pointed out, "scientists are used to having their science reviewed. In this case, it was reviewed by people with a broader, different perspective."

Coinciding with the report's release last week, the reported theft of two genetically engineered strains of a pig pathogen from the laboratory of Martha Mulks at Michigan State University (MSU) raised the specter of agricultural bioterrorism. The stolen pathogens were more toxic strains of the bacterium Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae, which causes a fatal pneumonia in pigs but responds to antibiotics and poses no threat to humans, according to university officials.

MSU's Vice President for University Relations Terry Denbow refused to comment on motive, or the method by which the material was taken, but said police have identified a suspect and that the stolen pathogens were apparently destroyed.